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Abstract
The aim of the paper is to check the influence of the degree of forward-lookingness of
economic agents on the optimal monetary policy rules, using several versions of a small, highly
aggregated structural model describing the transmission mechanism in the spirit of the New
Keynesian School. We show the optimal policy rule with the monetary authority loss function as an
optimality criterion. We also study changes in the optimal policy rule resulting from the varying
degree of forward-lookingness in the model and investigate the nature of the formal relationship
between the degree of forward-lookingness of the model and the shape of the optimal monetary
policy rule. 
JEL: E31, E52, E58, E61Introduction
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Introduction
The aim of the paper is to check the influence of the degree of forward-lookingness of
economic agents on the optimal monetary policy rules, using several versions of a small, highly
aggregated structural model describing the transmission mechanism in the spirit of the New
Keynesian School. 
Forward-looking behaviour - although postulated by the economic theory - is represented in
the fully estimated ÒbenchmarkÓ version of the model to a very limited degree. In particular, the
short-run Phillips curve is mostly backward-looking (the expected inflation is only in about 10
percent forward-looking), exhibiting thus a feature that has been suggested by previous analyses
of expectations from the survey data. Likewise, forward-lookingness of the forex market has been
strongly rejected by the data, and therefore exchange rate in the model is also backward-looking.
However, some form of forward-looking expectations is also introduced into the UIP condition
through the interest rate term structure, allowing the expected interest rate changes affect the
exchange rate path. There is also a forward-looking element in the IS curve Ð namely ex ante real
interest rate (i.e. nominal interest rate deflated by consumersÕ inflation expectations). However,
some studies strongly suggest changing degree of economic agentsÕ forward lookingness, with the
adoption of inflation targeting being one of the possible factors thereof. The EU accession is likely
to further stimulate this process.
We also study changes in the optimal policy rule resulting from the varying degree of
forward-lookingness in the model and investigate the nature of the formal relationship between the
degree of forward-lookingness of the model and the shape of the optimal monetary policy rule. 
The paper is built as follows: Section 1 is a short review of the related literature, in the Section
2 we discuss monetary and fiscal policy over the period 1990-2005, stressing their changes, since
we believe that this was an important factor affecting expectations formation. Section 3 shows a
small-scale structural model of the Polish economy, estimated with classical econometric method,
Section 4 presents modifications introduced to the benchmark model and discusses some problems
concerning its Bayesian estimation. Next, Section 5 is devoted to the discussion of results and
Section 6 concludes. All tables and charts are in the Appendix. 6
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Survey of related literature
There is a constantly growing body of literature on robust monetary policy rules with model
uncertainty and imperfect knowledge about the structure of the economy. In this area of research
robustness is usually understood as a reasonable behaviour of macroeconomic stability across
differing assumptions on a true model of the economy.
Levin and Williams (2003) study three models differing with expectations formation and the
degree of inflation persistence. The first one has pure New Keynesian features, i.e. it does not
exhibit any persistence implying that both inflation and output gap depend on their future expected
values. The second one stands in a clear opposition Ð it is entirely backward looking model of
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) with high persistence and the third one is the Fuhrer (2000) model
with rational expectations but exhibiting persistence due to assumed habit formation. Levin and
Williams show that a rule obtained for one model may be inappropriate for another. In particular,
rules with interest rate smoothing perform well in the forward looking model, while the opposite
is true for the backward looking one. Searching for a robust rule they prove that the one exhibiting
moderate degree of smoothing performs well across the surveyed models, providing that the loss
function puts nontrivial weight on both inflation and output stabilisation.    
Adalid, Coenen and Mc Adam (2004) analyse the rules for models of the euro area. The
models differ with respect to size and aggregation, degree of forward lookingness and adherence
to micro foundations. Namely, they consider the Coenen-Wieland (2000) model of a small size for
a closed economy, exhibiting inflation persistence that results from the assumed pattern of wage
negotiations (todayÕs wages are set with respect to past contracts), Smets-Wouters (2003) model,
i.e. a New Keynesian DSGE model for a closed economy, the Area Wide Model (AWM) - a workhorse
of the ECB inflation forecasting process, a medium size hybrid model for an open economy
(exchange rate affects aggregate demand) with Keynesian effects in the short-run, and the
neoclassical in the long-run. Finally, they use the Dis-aggregate Euro Area Model, a multi-country
version of the Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) model. The authors confirm the results obtained for
the models of the US economy, namely that the degree of forward lookingness is a crucial factor
that determines policy rule Ð forward looking models perform better with a rule that exhibits
interest rate smoothing, whereas backward looking ones require more aggressive policy. The rules
which are optimal for backward looking models perform also quite well in the forward looking
models, while the opposite is not true, i.e. a robust rule has only a limited degree of smoothing. 
Orphanides and Willimas (2004) focus on robust rules in a case of a structural change in the
economy and imperfect knowledge of both a central bank and private agents about the ÒtrueÓ
structure of the economy. In particular, a structural change in the economy makes both natural
interest rate and natural unemployment rate evolve, so the monetary policy decision making body
cannot observe their precise values. Orphanides and Williams discard the usual assumptions
governing formation of expectations of the private agents. Namely, instead of assuming that the
agents know perfectly the structure of the economy, they adopt a competing assumption that
private agents know correctly the structure, but only learn about the parameters in the modelÕs
relationships. Using a two-equation model of the U.S. economy with habit formation and a hybrid
Phillips curve, Orphanides and Williams show that if one assumes learning and imperfect
knowledge about the natural rate, monetary policy should react more aggressively with respect to
inflation and less aggressively with respect to unemployment gap relative to an optimal policy
under the assumption of a perfect knowledge. The more inertial monetary policy, the smaller is the
effect of a central bank misperception of the natural rate of interest. Therefore, a so-called
difference rule performs well in the case of time varying natural rate, but significantly worse if the1
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natural rate is constant and known by the central bank. Gaspar and Smets (2002) further develop
the issue of monetary policy response when private sector is learning. They show that with
perpetual learning a large weight on output gap stabilisation may lead to unhinging inflation
expectations when a series of cost-push shocks hit the economy in the same direction.   
A review of these papers leads us to a somewhat contradictive conclusion: interest rate
smoothing is desirable if the true model is forward-looking, but not for a backward-looking one.
On the other hand, if there is uncertainty about the true value of natural rates Ð either interest or
unemployment, a rule with interest rate smoothing performs better1. 
1 It should be stressed however, that the lead-lag structure of the Phillips curve in the Orphanides and Williams model
is 0.5 and 0.5, i.e. it is more forward looking than some of the other models considered above (e.g. AWM), but
monetary policy should react much more aggressively to inflation disturbances than to the output gap.   8
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Monetary and fiscal policies in Poland: 
a short history of the last 15 years
2.1. Monetary policy
TodayÕs shape of the Polish monetary policy results from three important factors: first,
monetary policy was to support the stabilisation plan and restructuring of the foreign debt in the
early 90s. Second, it had to be adjusted to meet the needs of the economy undergoing a transition
from centrally planned to the market economy2. Finally, monetary policy has been to support the
EU entry and the adoption of the euro. In such conditions, monetary policy had to undergo many
substantial changes over these years. In this section we shall briefly characterise monetary policy
evolution3, and show that monetary policy framework that can be considered as homogenous,
emerged only after 1999. 
Up to 1993 monetary policy was dominated by a stabilisation plan and debt restructuring.
Over this period, the final goal was inflation reduction. The National Bank of Poland4 (NBP) used two
intermediate targets, namely exchange rate and net domestic assets of the banking sector to
implement this goal. After the failure of using interest rate as an operational target in 1990, NBP
resorted to administrative tools (credit limits). Only in 1993 with the expansion of budget deficit and
the increasing role of T-bills in banks assets, NBP started to conduct open market operations, but
short-term interest rate control was clearly visible in the money market a bit later, namely in 1994.
In the early 90s exchange rate policy was to a large extent independent of interest rate policy
due to controls and limits imposed on capital flows and high country risk that discouraged foreign
investors. Exchange rate was used to achieve two, somewhat contradictive goals, namely it served
as a nominal anchor, but also to increase foreign exchange reserves (via increased exports) to ensure
an ordered service of the foreign debt. The latter of these goals was supported by a predetermined
monthly exchange rate depreciation, whereas the former by the informal rule to maintain the
monthly depreciation lower than expected PPI increase.    
Foreign private debt restructuring in 1994 as well as the resolution of bad debts problem in
the domestic banking system significantly lowered the country risk and induced a large capital
inflow. This in turn resulted in the current account surplus5, a considerable surplus liquidity of the
banking system, increase in money supply and the upward pressure on the exchange rate. These
phenomena made a serious problem for the central bank, since on one hand, it targeted money
supply but on the other it had still to care about the level of foreign reserves. NBP decided to put
more stress on a quick build-up of foreign reserves at a cost of somewhat higher inflation first, but
once they reached the desired level, the central bank started a more rigorous disinflation process
with more aggressive exchange rate policy. Thus, next years brought about gradual but profound
changes in the exchange rate regime, namely its evolution from fixed to the pure float6. The process
2 Until 1990 none of the market mechanisms worked in Poland. Thus, the evolution of monetary policy necessarily
embraced a gradual abandonment of administrative tools and regulations.
3 For a more detailed description see: KokoszczyÄski, Durjasz (1998) and KokoszczyÄski, üyziak, Przystupa, Wrbel
(forthcoming 2006).
4 I.e. Polish central bank.
5 It was not a sole cause of a fast growing C/A surplus. Due to a significant price differential between Poland and
neighbouring countries, there was a big increase in the cross-border trade.
6 Pure float was introduced de jure in April 2000, however de facto regime very close to the pure float functioned since
1999.2
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started in May 1995 Ð since then exchange rate could float within a certain range around central
parity. This range was enlarged from ±7% at the beginning of the flotation process to ±15% in
1999. Moreover, to offset the inflationary pressures and negative impact on inflationary
expectations coming from monthly predetermined path of exchange rate depreciation, NBP
gradually reduced this rate. De jure pure float was introduced in April 2000. However since 1999
a de facto regime was very close to the pure float. 
Up to 1997 monetary aggregate (M2) was used as an intermediate goal of monetary policy,
with short-term interest rate in 1995 and then reserve money (M0) serving as an operational target.
The change of the operational target was a result of capital inflows and surplus liquidity of the
banking system7 as well as a then-existing possibility of debt monetization by the central bank8. In
these circumstances central bank lost its impact on longer-term bond yields and in fact its
instrument independence. Using reserve money as the operational target was not successful either
(once again the obligation of debt monetization was an obstacle in the efficient control of the
targeted variable). 
The year 1998 makes a breakthrough in the Polish monetary policy. Since then debt
monetization was prohibited by the new constitutional law as well as by other legal acts. Monetary
policy was to be conducted by a newly introduced decision making body Ð Monetary Policy Council
(MPC) that consisted of 10 persons elected for a six years term by the president of the state and the
parliament9. The newly elected MPC members decided to change monetary policy framework from
money supply targeting to inflation targeting and to use short-term interest rate as the policy
instrument10. The IT framework is still in use and, as one may expect, will be valid at least until the
ERM2 entry. 
Inflation targeting was at first introduced implicitly; only in 1999 it became the explicitly
declared monetary framework. At the time, although inflation had been continuously falling,
Poland still experienced two-digit inflation rate. Thus, the MPC decided that reducing inflation
below 4% at the end of 2003 would be its principal goal. In this aim it intensified the process of
the exchange rate liberalisation. Since the target set only for the year ending the MPC term would
be difficult to use operationally, the MPC used to set a target for each year, either as a range, or as
a point (with - or without a band). As soon as inflation seemed to credibly stabilise at a low level
and the process of disinflation has been over Ð the MPC defined the inflation target as a permanent
one and set it at 2.5% ± 1pp. This level seemed to be appropriate from both the future fulfilment
of the Maastricht criteria and GDP growth perspectives. 
Over the time, the MPC tried to make the IT system more transparent. This includes a decision
to publish the NBP staffÕs inflation forecast since August 2004, to be explicit about the way the
current state of the economy is evaluated (e.g. the role of core inflation), to explain the way MPC
would react to the supply shocks, to express its commitment to react symmetrically in the episodes
of inflation missing the target. On the other hand, NBP has also got a negative experience with the
IT. This embraces a failure to meet inflation targets over the period 1998-2004 and changing twice
the targets in the course of the year with all consequences for credibility, a failure to anchor
inflationary expectations of private individuals and backward-lookingness of the monetary policy.   
7 To absorb surplus liquidity NBP resorted to issuing its own bills with long-term maturities (up to 273 days).
8 The maximal level of debt monetization was set in the central bank law, but the parliament usually suspended this
clause and instead adopted another one, compelling the central bank to monetize Ònot less thanÓ a certain amount of
the debt.
9 Up to 1998 all decisions were taken by the central bank governor.
10 At first NBP conducted open market operations with the maturity of  28 days, in 2003 they were shortened to 14 days
and in 2005 Ð to 7 days. 10
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2.2. Fiscal policy 1990-2005
Comparing to the monetary policy, fiscal policy was probably a bit less variable. What is more
important, the main changes occurred at the beginning of the transition, but as we shall argue Ð
the next changes will have to come in a near future.
Before 1990 the main purpose of budget formulation process in the so called centrally
planed economies was to translate the governmentÕs economic plans, which were specified in
terms of material and physical inputs and outputs, into public sector inputs and outputs in financial
terms. This means that instead of controlling the allocation of public resources, the fiscal planning
process was controlled by the governmentÕs overall economic plan (developed by the central
planning institution). On the other hand, it induced budgeting from a perspective of needs (defined
by the pre-established norms) without accounting for resource availability, what led to the
construction of unrealistic budgets. 
Collapse of the communist rule in 1989 started with reshaping of the centrally planned
system into the market-oriented economy. During the first years of transition the radical changes
took place in the economic structure Ð the public sector was separated from the productive one,
and afterwards, the productive enterprises were successively privatized. The policy makers pursued
the economic reforms putting an equal weight to halt the process of economic decline and to
maintain a minimum level of political and social stability. Structural economic reforms were
gradually followed by the institutional transformation. The responsibility for fiscal policy was shifted
towards the Ministry of Finance and the role of the budget was redefined from being an appendix
of the central plan to an active tool of economic planning to ensure credibility (and hence stability)
of the economy. Between 1990 and 1993 it meant maintaining social stability under declining
output and near-hyperinflation. Despite tax reforms (corporate and personal income taxes (1990),
VAT and excise tax (1993) were introduced), declining budget revenues forced the NBP to finance
costs of the fiscal policy (i.e. the budget deficit in 80% in 1991 and 65% in 1993). 
During the next five years (1994-1998) fiscal policy was lax11 but relatively stable. A fast GDP
growth resulting in an increase in revenues allowed for some reductions in tax rates.  However, the
privatisation process was slowed-down. The Russian crisis which broke out in 1998 decelerated
Polish GDP growth. All these factors induced a shrink in the tax base. The inertia of public
expenditure resulted in a significant growth of deficit in the next years. Unsustainable level of
budget deficit induced changes in the fiscal policy in the next period.  
In 1999 four great institutional reforms were started. They embraced following areas: local-
government, health care, pension system and education system. The first two reforms shifted a part
(about 12%) of the total public expenditure from the state budget to the local ones and to the
National Health Fund. The case of the pension reform was different: a gradual transition from the
pay-as-you-go system to the capital system without reduction of existing pensions led to huge
deficiency of social security contributions which have had to be continuously covered by the state
budget. In fact, the state budget deficit grew from 2.4% in 1998 to 7.1% in 200412. 
* *   * *   * *
Modern economic history of Poland started in 1990, however the period up to 1998 was
mostly devoted to implementing market mechanisms which made significant structural changes
that in turn induced still changing reactions of the economy to policy instruments. Over this period
the transmission mechanism was undergoing many changes that made it impossible to define
stable macroeconomic relations. Our earlier research on the Polish monetary transmission
mechanism (KokoszczyÄski et.al.(1999) shows that before 1999 interest rate did not significantly
affect either inflation or aggregate demand and that exchange rate was the main transmission
11 As a result, monetary policy had to be more restrictive what resulted in an inefficient policy mix.
12 National data.2
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channel. Up to 1998 monetary policy in Poland underwent many modifications with respect to its
instruments (M0, interest rates), as well as much more profound adjustments of the exchange rate
regime (increasing flexibility). Since 1999 Poland has a stable monetary policy framework (IT), and
the economy seems to react as stylised facts would suggest: interest rate shocks induce lower
inflation and reduce the aggregate demand. Besides monetary and fiscal policies there were also
other factors that after 1999 tended to change the MTM. Namely, a near perspective of the EU
accession changed the attitude of foreign investors as well as of exporters and as a result, the role
of the exchange rate in the monetary transmission. It seems that it affects real sector less than
before, while there are no visible changes in inflation reaction to the exchange rate. 
All that has so far been said about changes that monetary and fiscal policies underwent and
accompanying adjustments of the monetary transmission mechanism, leads us to the problem of
model uncertainty. Thus, if there is a substantial uncertainty about the ÒtrueÓ model of the
developed market economies, it is probably even more so for economies in transition. There is also
a problem of expectations formation. McCallum and Nelson (2000) note that Òit seems implausible
that private agents could immediately begin forming their expectation consistent with any new
policy regime, following a regime change (É)Ó and conclude that Òthe basic rational expectations
approach requires that policy regime has been in effect long enough for private agents to
understand that and believe in its continuation.Ó Thus, a short life time of any policy regime and
perspective of future policy variations and modifications have probably made private agentsÕ
expectations look predominantly backwards and limited the number of variables considered by the
agents as worth observing taking into account the cost of information acquisition and its
processing. Research on inflation expectations based on consumer surveys (üyziak, forthcoming)
leads to the conclusion that even if the adoption of inflation targeting in Poland in 1998 and the
commitment of monetary authorities to reach price stability, decreased substantially the level of
expected inflation, only very weak signs of consumer inflation expectations in Poland becoming
more macroeconomically efficient and forward-looking appear in the most recent period. 12
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Small scale inflation forecasting model: an outline
In this section we briefly present a small scale highly aggregated model that was developed
at the NBP in 2001 and served for inflation forecasting (NSA, see K¸os et al., 2005) up to the end
of 2005. The model was designed to capture inflation dynamics only. It was built on the standard
assumptions of sticky prices and wages and described the transmission mechanism in the spirit of
the New Keynesian School. Basic macroeconomic relationships included: the aggregate demand
curve13, uncovered interest parity (UIP) and the Phillips curve. The model had a few forward-looking
features:
Ð a measure of inflationary expectations (equation 6) was constructed in such a way that
q =0.9, i.e.expected prices are in 10 percent forward-looking and in 90 percent backward-looking, 
Ð there was an ex ante real interest rate in the IS curve,
Ð the exchange rate equation (UIP condition) was supplemented by the interest rate term
structure which shows expected changes of the interest rate. 
The model was estimated equation by equation, on a quarterly sample beginning in 1998.











13 Output gap obtained from the HP filter (with the smoothing parameter l=1600 standard for quarterly estimates).3
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The following symbols have been used:
Ð output gap;
Ð real GDP growth rate in the euro zone;
Ð WIBOR 3M interbank market rate in nominal terms;
Ð WIBOR 1M interbank market rate in nominal terms;
Ð WIBOR 3M interbank market rate in real terms;
Ð LIBOR 3M foreign interbank market rate in nominal terms;
Ð nominal effective exchange rate (in logs);
Ð real effective exchange rate (in logs);
Ð USD/PLN exchange rate (in logs);
Ð EUR/USD exchange rate (in logs);
Ð euro weight used for the determination of the nominal effective exchange
rateÐrecently equal to 70%;
Ð rate of growth of CPI, except for food and fuel prices (net inflation), quarter on
quarter;
Ð rate of growth of food prices, quarter on quarter;
Ð rate of growth of fuel prices, quarter on quarter;
Ð
Ð weight of food in the CPI basket;
Ð weight of fuels in the CPI basket;
Ð oil price per barrel on world markets (USD, in logs);
Ð domestic financing of the budget deficit;
Ð foreign financing of the budget deficit;
Ð inflation, quarter on quarter;
Ð central bank inflation target;
Ð food price level;
Ð consumer price level (goods and services);
Ð consumersÕ inflation expectations (for the next quarter);
Equation (1) is the aggregate demand curve in an open economy. The output gap in this
equation depends on its lagged value, the ex-ante real interest rate, the real effective exchange rate
and the variable representing external demand. 
The growth of prices of food, fuels and the remaining consumer goods and services Ñ are
modelled by separate equations. According to the identity (2), inflation as measured by the rate of
growth in consumer price index (CPI) is a weighted average of price increases of the three
components of the consumer basket. In the Phillips curve (equation (3), the explained variable is net
inflation. Output gap, the real effective exchange rate and householdsÕ inflation expectations
(quantified direct measure based on survey data) are the explanatory variables. Equation (4),14
which is used for simulation purposes only,15 makes the quarterly increase in food prices dependent
on its lagged value, net inflation, the increase in fuel prices and the relative food price in the earlier
14 Using identity (2) the general form of equation (4):
[a]
may be transformed into:
[b]
15 In forecasts based on the presented model, the increase in food prices is subject to expert assumptions.14
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period. The increase in oil prices is described by equation (5). Fuel price changes depend on the
price of a barrel of oil in domestic currency, the lagged inflation and changes in the output gap. 
The USD/PLN exchange rate is modelled within the concept of the UIP (equation (7)). The
empirical version of the exchange rate rule is the adaptive one (the so-called UIP+). The explanatory
variables of the USD/PLN exchange rate are the lagged value of this variable, the interest rate
disparity, the term structure of interest rates, the EUR/USD cross rate and risk factors. The list of risk
factors includes budget deficit, net exports, foreign direct investment, etc. The nominal effective
exchange rate is determined Ñ in line with the arbitrage condition Ñ as a function of the USD/PLN
exchange rate and the EUR/USD cross rate (exogenous variable) Ñ equation (8). 
Monetary policy rule (9) is used for simulations only. One version of the rule is derived from
the traditional Taylor rule: the nominal interest rate responds to the deviation of inflation from the
inflation target and the deviation of the GDP from its potential value. In the other, there is interest
rate smoothing and the rule is forecast-based.
Dynamic properties of the model are shown in Table 11 of the Appendix. 4
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4
Modification of the benchmark model 
and design of the experiment
The benchmark version of the model performed quite well up to the end of 2004. Since then
it started to underpredict aggregate demand and seemed to overestimate the impact of the
exchange rate on the output gap. One may suspect that these phenomena occurred as a result of
the increasing role of inflation expectations after IT adoption (we have observed that inflation
expectations became slightly forward looking) and the EU entry. Since 2001, when the date of the
entry was established, agents could start to adapt their behaviour to the expected fiercer
competition. Accession to the EU in the mid-2004 could even accelerate these processes. Basing on
these hypotheses and assuming the general theoretical concept of the benchmark model is still
valid, one could expect that incorporating expectations into the model should improve its
performance and would allow us to do an exercise on robustness of monetary policy rules. 
Thus, three core equations of the benchmark model: aggregate demand, UIP condition and
the Phillips curve were modified in the following way16:
where:
Ð exogenous disturbance term (white noise shock with standard deviation sy ^)
Ð dynamics of the budget deficit;
q Ð estimated parameters, 
k Ð degree of forward lookingness,
(11)
where
eeUSD/PLN Ð exogenous disturbance term (white noise shock with standard deviation seUSD/PLN
)
(12) 
where (as explained earlier in the text; see equation 6)
ep Ð exogenous disturbance term (white noise shock with standard deviation sp )
^
16 Notation as in the benchmark model.
(10)16
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For  k=0.0 to k=1 with a step equal to 0.1, monetary policy rules were tested in three forms:
(13)
The second form of the monetary policy rule arises from the PolandÕs striving for the
membership in the euro zone, what implies necessity to stabilize both the variance of inflation and
variance of dynamics of the nominal exchange rate. That does not necessarily lead to optimisation
of variance of the output gap, or the output gap itself.
To check which monetary rule performs better in the economy described by the benchmark
model and its modifications, two types of the loss functions have been defined:
1) We have assumed that the policy maker tends to minimize simultaneously variance of
inflation and exchange rate (external requirement) and the variance of output gap. Thus, for each
k, the following loss function has been compared17:
2) In the second type of the loss function we have assumed that the policy maker tends to
minimize variance of inflation and variance of output gap:
In the section 2 we have shown changes that underwent Poland over the last 15 years, from
centrally planned with predominant state ownership to the market economy and the EU
membership. Thus, when it comes to modelling, one must cope with a number of problems:
relatively short time series that could be perceived as homogenous, poor data quality (mainly at the
beginning of the transformation process) and necessary changes in statistics (adjusting definitions
to the international standards). Non homogeneity of series results from structural changes,
comprising privatisation process, liberalisation of prices (including the exchange rate) and markets
as well as of capital flows together with frequent changes in monetary policy. All these factors make
short series even shorter. Keeping in mind problems with data scarcity, changing definitions and
with parameters non-constancy we decided to apply Bayesian estimation instead of classical
econometric estimation. Some suggestions how to tackle that problem can be found in Charemza
(2002), where drawing parameters from iteratively changing distributions with the straightforward
objective function was presented as a realistic alternative to the econometric estimation. Choosing
the Bayesian estimation under presented circumstances, we have to note the necessity of
adaptation of the model to the Bayesian procedure and explaining the role of setting up prior
distributions. Thus, three core equations of the benchmark model and the policy rule were
separated and took the form presented at the beginning of this section. To close the model, all
exogenous variables of the benchmark model were endogenized. They were approximated by the
AR processes or the processes similar to the AR or by equations which are the linear combination
of the AR process and variables explained within the core model. All variables, but exchange rates
and interest rates, representing levels were replaced by their stationary or stationary-like
approximations. 
The problem of setting up prior distributions of parameters seems to be crucial if there is data
scarcity. Prior distribution should reflect up-to-date state of our knowledge. To convert our
and
(14)   
(15)
17 See e.g. Levin, Wieland and Williams (2003).4
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knowledge into a distribution several techniques can be used. We have applied a combination of
expert and conjunction approach. In the case of the former approach, prior is naturally based on
expertÕs knowledge, whereas in the latter Ð one must find such a prior that when used in
conjunction with the likelihood, it gives an easy form for posterior distributions. These types of
priors are called conjugate priors and depend on the form of likelihood, e.g.:
Distribution of likelihood          Parameter         Distribution of prior/posterior
normal                              mean (m)                          normal
normal                             variance (s2)                    inverse gamma
In the whole exercise the normal distributions of the likelihood were accepted. Then, having
estimated parameters of the econometric version of the benchmark model we assumed that they
incorporate our pre-experiment knowledge on the Polish economy. Hence values of these
parameters were set up as means in the normal distribution of the respective parameters. Variances
of the distribution were determined bearing in mind that if the prior variance is large, then the prior
can be uninformative (a flat line in the distribution chart).  Although improper priors are difficult to
interpret literally, since in any case there are upper and/or lower bounds which limit possible values
of the unknown parameter, they can be viewed useful as long as one considers that the posterior
is well-defined. However, because of its flatness, the posterior is dominated by the likelihood, and
it is only in the range in which the likelihood is large that the prior makes any practical difference
- truncating the prior well outside this range will not substantially change the posterior. 
In economic problems, it can be sometimes useful to set up a flat or uninformative prior so
that the data can Òspeak for itself". The prior thus has a hypothetical, or Òwhat if" status: if one was
indifferent to parameter values in the range in which the likelihood is large, then her opinion after
observing the data would be expressed as the posterior (illustrated in Tables 1-4).18
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We have performed estimates with various degrees of forward lookingness and for three time
periods (1998-2005, 1998-2001, 2001-2005) for k=0.018 to k=0.5 with a step equal to 0.119. We
have adopted the lead-lag structure similar to Orphanides and Williams (2004), even though some
authors suggest that the forward-looking factor in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) is
dominant20. Our decision to adopt such a lead-lag structure can be justified by a set of reasons.
First, as we have shown, frequent changes in the monetary policy in Poland did not support
development of forward-lookingness of economic agents. Second, we do our exercise not on a
single equation but using the whole model, which involves also other than expected inflation
forward-looking variables. Third, this lead-lag structure is frequently used in empirical works since
it appeals to Fuhrer and Moore (1995) who have built a model of contracting in the labour market
that results in such a lead-lag structure and to Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) who
modify the Calvo model by introduction of indexation and derive a specification of the NKPC
yielding a parameter at the lagged inflation larger than 0.5.
The model turned out to be unsolvable for the period 1998-2001. After analysing possible
reasons, we have tentatively concluded that providing that it was not due to changes in definitions
of variables, a plausible explanation is that over this period Polish economy did not work as the
model would suggest. 
Estimations obtained from Bayesian estimates and from the traditional econometric method
for the whole period 1998-2005 were significantly different in two important cases. Namely,
Bayesian estimates gave a puzzling, positive sign of the parameter at the real interest rate in the IS
curve (as expected, in the estimated version the sign was negative) and a stunningly high parameter
at inflation expectations in the Phillips curve (see Tables 5-7 in the Appendix). A simple inspection
of graphs presenting response of annual inflation to selected impulses (Table 12) shows that
inflation response to the interest rate shock is counter-intuitive exhibiting a clear puzzle.  
Moreover, if one considers steady state solution obtained for this period it will be clear that
the figures are not acceptable (e.g. enormously big positive output gap instead of being equal to
zero, with both very high short-term interest rate and core inflation, see Table 8 in the Appendix).
The steady state solution should produce values of macroeconomic variables that would be
sustainable in the long-run. In our opinion the obtained results did not look as long-run sustainable
solution and therefore we have to reject this solution. 
From this point of view, the results for the shorter period, 2001-2005 look much more
reasonable, especially these for k=0, i.e. with backward looking expectations. They are, however,
still somewhat biased by the short data span. In particular, once again output gap is positive (but
now it is much smaller that in the previous case), and interest rate can be considered as a bit too
high. On the other hand, inflation is close to the official target of 2.5%. Response functions
presented in Table 13 of the Appendix confirm that the obtained results are reasonable: both
inflation and output gap decrease after the interest rate shocks, whereas exchange rate appreciates
18  It should be remembered that even with k=0 there is some forward-lookingness in the model (real ex ante interest
rate, term structure in the UIP condition and 10 per cent inflation expectations in the Phillips curve are also forward-
looking). 
19 As the first approximation we have chosen such a step just to limit the number of model versions, but as it will be
clear, it was too big in some case and therefore we have made simulations with a smaller step, at least in the
neighborhood of 0.0 and 0.2.     
20  The most influential work in this field is Gali, Gertler (1999). The results raised critiques see for example: Rudd, Whelan
(2005), Linde (2005).5
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(Table 18).  These results are robust both for a two-factor simple rule and three factor rule including
exchange rate (see Table 4 in the Appendix). It is worth noting that the steady state solution for
k=0.2 is close to the previous one, reaction functions are acceptable, but the parameter at the
output gap seems to exhibit too high persistence (it is slightly greater than one). Steady state
solutions and parameters estimates for k=0.1, k=0.3 and k=0.4, as well as the reaction functions
in these cases unfortunately do not look reasonable. As far as the steady state is concerned, either
interest rate or output gap are unrealistically high or inflation is too high or on the contrary, it is
almost equal to zero. It is a bit strange that we have to reject the solution for k=0.1, whereas these
for k=0.0 and k=0.2 seem to be acceptable. In the further research we shall check whether the
solutions for the neighbourhood of the point 0.2 could be also acceptable.
Plausibility of results for k=0 and k=0.2 is reflected in the respective monetary policy rules.
Both for the simple and the three factor rule the factor weights are similar. However, for the three
factor rule the results exhibit a clear preference of the Monetary Policy Council for output
stabilisation in the period 2001-2005 (see Table 9 in the Appendix). The factor weights for the
simple rule are more balanced. It is an amazing result, bearing in mind goals explicitly declared by
the MPC (at least over the period starting from the last quarter of 1999 to the end of 2003). These
results seem to be distorted by the high variability of output over this period: recession at its
beginning and strong recovery in 2004, the latter supported by the PolandÕs EU entry (huge growth
of domestic demand as a result of expected higher inflation after the accession). Considering a
simple loss function it seems to be clear, that focusing monetary policy on the output gap
stabilisation yields a bigger loss than in the case when policy is focused on inflation and even when
three factors, but symmetrically distributed (output, inflation, exchange rate), are taken into
account (see Table 9 and 10). The results obtained for two and three factor loss function are quite
similar (slightly better results are for the simple rule), what leads to the conclusion that exchange
rate can be omitted in the monetary policy rule. To compare our results with other papers we have
also estimated the model with the standard Taylor rule, i.e. with equal weights of inflation and
output gap (for k=0). The loss function is significantly smaller, but the steady state inflation rate
turns out to be lower by a half percentage point than the target (2.5%).  
All these results were obtained for the monetary policy rule with no interest rate smoothing.
To check how interest rate smoothing affects the loss function, we have estimated the model for
various degrees of forward-lookingness. We got the solutions only for k=0, k=0.1, k=0.2. The
obtained scale of interest rate smoothing varied from 0.7 to 0.9 respectively. These results seem to
confirm the more forward-looking the model, the higher is the smoothing parameter. The loss
function with interest rate smoothing tends to be smaller than the one with no smoothing and
smaller than the three factor monetary policy rule. Exclusion of the exchange rate from the loss
function shows that the interest rate smoothing minimizes potential loss of  inflation and output
gap (with no effect on the exchange rate)  We think that even such a small degree of forward-
lookingness that is incorporated into our model justifies interest rate smoothing. 20
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Contrary to our expectations the results seem not to confirm the hypothesis that expectations
formation has changed and that they became more forward-looking. The best version of the model
tested here is the version with a small degree of forward-lookingness. This outcome is a surprise
and, if it is true, it may be a problem for the monetary policy. As we know, disinflation with
backward-looking agents tends to cost more. A separate question is whether our results may be
interpreted as a failure of inflation targeting as a strategy affecting significantly behaviour of the
public. Here, the answer is to be given with more qualifications. One is, that the period our research
covers was not a friendly environment for this kind of strategy induced changes. Another concerns
the very limited success of the IT strategy when perceived by numerous deviations from the target.
The question of how advanced is forward-looking behaviour in the Polish economy seems
again to persecute us when seeking for the best rule. Interest rate smoothing comes with strength
usual for more forward-looking models than the one presented here (see Adalid, Coenen, McAdam,
Siviero (2004).  So, there arises a question how to reconcile these results with the literature. This is
the important question for our future research.  7
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Table 1
Prior and posterior distribution of parameters for k=0 and 1998-2000 estimation period8
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Table 2
Prior and posterior distribution of parameters for k=0 and 2001-2005 estimation period24
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Table 3
Prior and posterior distribution of parameters for k=0.1 and 2001-2005 estimation period8
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Table 4
Prior and posterior distribution of parameters for k=0.2 and 2001-2005 estimation period26
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Table 8
Steady state (in %)
Monetary policy rules with: inflation, output gap, exchange rate
Table 9
Monetary policy rules Ð factor weights (in%)
Table 10
Loss function
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Table 11
Benchmark model - response of annual inflation to selected impulses Ð deviations from the
baseline (in percentage points)
Table 12
Response of annual inflation to selected impulses Ð deviations from the baseline (in
percentage points)
Bayesian estimated NSA model for 1998-2005 and k=0 and three factor MPR.8
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Table 13
Response of annual inflation to selected impulses Ð deviations from the baseline (in
percentage points)
Bayesian estimated NSA model for 2001-2005 and k=0 and three factor MPR.
Table 14
Response of annual inflation to selected impulses Ð deviations from the baseline (in
percentage points)
Bayesian estimated NSA model for 2001-2005 and k=0.1 and three factor MPR.30
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Table 15
Response of annual inflation to selected impulses Ð deviations from the baseline (in
percentage points)
Bayesian estimated NSA model for 2001-2005 and k=0.2 and three factor MPR.
Table 16
Response of annual inflation to selected impulses Ð deviations from the baseline (in
percentage points)
Bayesian estimated NSA model for 2001-2005 and k=0.3 and three factor MPR.8
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Table 17
Response of annual inflation to selected impulses Ð deviations from the baseline (in
percentage points)
Bayesian estimated NSA model for 2001-2005 and k=0.4 and three factor MPR.
Table 18
Response of annual inflation to selected impulses Ð deviations from the baseline (in
percentage points)
Bayesian estimated NSA model for 2001-2005 and k=0 (Simple Taylor rule).32
8
Appendix
National Bank of Poland
Table 19
Response of annual inflation to selected impulses Ð deviations from the baseline (in
percentage points)
Bayesian estimated NSA model for 2001-2005 and k=0 (estimated smoothing q =0.71).
Table 20
Response of annual inflation to selected impulses Ð deviations from the baseline (in
percentage points)
Bayesian estimated NSA model for 2001-2005 and k=0.1 (estimated smoothing q =0.79).8
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Table 21
Response of annual inflation to selected impulses Ð deviations from the baseline (in
percentage points)
Bayesian estimated NSA model for 2001-2005 and k=0.2 (estimated smoothing q=0.94).
Table 22
Response of output gap and USD/PLN exchange rate to short-term interest rate change Ð
deviations from the baseline (in percentage points)
Bayesian estimated NSA models. 34
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